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IN THE SUPREME 
OF THE STATE OF 
In the Matter of the Application 
of 
MARLA MORSE for a 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 
MARLA MORSE, 
COURT 
UTAH 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOE STEED and MARJORIE STEED, 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 8764 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT JOE STEED 
ADDITIONAL STATMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent desires to call to the Court's attention 
the following additional facts from those stated in appel-
lant's brief. 
The infant daughter of the unwed mother, Marla Morse, 
was voluntarily surrendered to the defendants, Joseph W. 
Steed and Marjorie Steed, his wife, with a written consent 
to adoption, a copy of which consent is marked exhibit 
"A" and attached to defendant Joe Steed's answer. The 
defendants, after receiving custody of the child and the 
written consent of the mother, paid the hospital charges 
of the mother in connection with her confinement and the 
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birth of the child and obligated themselves to pay the ex-
penses of the doctor in connection with the confinement. 
They have cared for the child continuously since custody 
was given to them by the mother on September 9, 1957. 
The child has continuously been at the home of the de-
fendants, in Idaho, during this period of time and the de-
fendants have developed a strong, loving, attachment and 
affection for said child. The mother, Marla Morse, has at 
no time since the child was placed in the custody of the de-
fendants by he·r, visited the home of the defendants or made 
any inquiry whatsoever as to the child's welfare or well-
bein·g. 
The defendants on the 20th day of September, 1957, 
filed their petition for the adoption of said child in the Pro-
bate Court of Oneida County, Idaho. The petitioner and 
appellant, Marla Morse, is represented by counsel in con-
nection with the adoption proceedings in the State of Idaho, 
which is being continued pending determination of this 
appeal. 
The defendant, Marjorie Steed, has never been served 
with process in this action and the Utah Court does not 
have jurisdiction over her. The said Marjorie Steed has 
custody of the child and would be the one with power to 
produce the absent child in the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE CHILD WHOSE CUSTODY IS 
SOUGHT IS NOT A DOMICILIARY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
POINT II. THE CHILD IS DOMICILED IN THE 
STATE OF IDAHO BEING AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD 
AND HAVING BEEN ABANDONED, DESERTED AND 
SURRENDERED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER UNDER 
A WRITTEN CONSENT AND RELEASE TO THE DE-
FENDANTS. 
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POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT OF WElBER 
COUNTY, UTAH, IN A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEED-
INGS, HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF 
THE INFANT IN THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
POINT IV. NO SERVICE OF PROCESS HAS BEEN 
HAD UPON THE DEFENDANT, MARJORIE STEED, IN 
THE STATE OF U1:AH, AND THE UTAH COURT HAS 
NO JURISDICTION OVER HER. THE DEFENDANT, 
MARJORIE STEED, IS THE ONE HAVING PRIMARY 
CONTROL OVER THE CHILD AND ONE WHO THE 
COURT COULD EXPECT TO PRODUCE THE CHILD. 
POINT IV. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FILED A 
PETITION FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD IN 
IDAHO WHICH IS THE PROPER COURT AND PRO-
CEEDING TO DETERMINE THE CUSTODY OF THE 
CIDLD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CHILD WHOSE CUSTODY IS 
SOUGHT IS NOT A DOMICILIARY OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
POINT II. THE CHILD IS DOMIGILED IN THE 
STATE OF IDAHO BEING AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD 
AND HA;VING BEEN ABANDONED, DESERTED AND 
SURRENDERED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER UNDER 
A WRI'ITEN CONSENT AND RELEASE TO THE DE-
FENDANTS. 
The child in question is the illegitimate child of the pe-
titioner and appellant, Marla Morse. Said Marla Morse, 
following the birth of said child abandoned, deserted and 
surrendered the child to the defendants Joseph S. Steed 
and Marjorie Steed, his wife, to be taken by them to their 
home in Stone, Idaho. This written consent was given by 
said Marla Morse freely and voluntarily before a notary 
public. See the copy of the consent attached to the answer 
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of defendant Joe Steed in the file. See Also 17A Am Jur. 
250. See. 71. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER 
COUNTY, UTAH, IN A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING 
HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE 
INFANT IN THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
The general rule is stated in 25 Am. Jur. 222 Sec. 106, 
as follows: 
"It may be laid down as a general rule that a 
court has no authority to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus directed to a person outside of its terri-
torial jurisdiction since it is a cardinal principal of 
law that no sovereignty can by its judgments or 
decrees directly bind or affect property or persons 
beyond the limit of that sovereignty. Generally 
speaking neither a state nor a federal court has 
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus direc-
ted to persons outside the territorial limits of the 
district in and for which the court was establish-
ed .... " 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with habeas 
corpus appear to presuppose that the person wrongfully 
restrained is within the state, or in other words, within the 
jurisdiction of the court. See Rule 65B (f) (5) which reads: 
"If the defendant conceals himself or refuses ad-
mittance to the person attempting to serve the writ 
or if he attempts wrongfully to carry the person im-
prisoned or restrained out of the county or state 
after service of the writ, the person serving the 
writ shall immediately arrest the defendant or 
other persons so retraining and bring him togeth-
er with the person designated in the writ forthwith 
before the court before which the writ is return-
able." 
See also Rule 65B (f) (6) which reads: 
"At the time of the issuance of the writ the court 
.may if it appears that the person designated will 
be carried out of the jurisdiction of the court or 
will suffer some irreparable injury before compli-
ance with the writ can be enforced, cause a wan·ant 
to issue reciting the facts and directing the sheriff 
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to take such person and forthwith bring him be-
fore the court to be dealt with according to law." 
Appellant's brief refers to the collection of cases in 9 
ALR 2d etseq. In this annotation we read on page 439, 
Sec. 3. 
"The judicial solution of problems regarding the 
custody of children, or for that matter of domestic 
relations generally has never been wholly satis-
factory either from a social or legal viewpoint, 
especially when multistate elements complicate the 
situation. There is little accord among the 
authorities as to the proper basis of jurisdiction to 
award custody of a minor ch~, and the cases deal-
ing with this question are in considerable confu-
sion." 
This same annotation discusses three theories as the basis 
for jurisdiction over the subject matter of a child custody 
proceeding. The one theory which has been adopted by 
the Restatement is simply one of status and as such subject 
to the Control of the courts of the state where the child is 
domiciled. The second theory treats the problem as one 
of determining the conflicting rights of the parents to the 
custody of their child and has held that in personam juris-
diction over the parents is sufficient, irrespective of the 
domicile or whereabouts of the child. This annotation states 
the third theory as follows: "A third theory considers that 
the fact that a child is physically present within the state 
is sufficient to give the courts of the state jurisdiction to 
award custody of the child on the ground that the basic prob-
lem before the court is to determine what the best interests 
of the child are and the court best qualified to do so is the 
one having access to the child. This view has been well 
expressed by Judge Cardozo, when he stated: 
"The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody 
of infants found within its territory does not de-
pend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its 
origin in the protection that is due to the incompe-
tent or helpless . . . . For this the residence of a 
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child suffices though the domicile be elsewhere." 
See 9 ALR 2d 440. 
In all of the cases cited in appellant's brief it is noted 
that the action grew out of a divorce proceeding. The 
cases deal generally with one ·state giving full faith and 
credit to an order or decree of another state or an instance 
where the court has jurisdiction of the parties to the di-
vorce proceedings and exercises its power to make a cus-
tody award of the children. In the case at bar there is no 
connection whatsoever with a divorce proceeding nor a 
question concerning the power of a court in a divorce pro-
ceeding with jurisdiction over the husband and wife, to 
make its order or decree determining custody of their chil-
dren in another state. 
There are numerous cases holding that the courts of 
one state have no legal control over, or interest in, the 
children of another state, and can make no order through 
its courts with respect thereto except to adjudicate the 
equitable personal rights of the parents themselves if both 
be before the court. See the annotation in 4 ALR 2d 25, 
also Peyton v. Peyton 29 NM 618, 225 P 576; Re Hubbard 
82 NY 90; State ex rei. Clark v. Clark, 4 So. 2d 517, 148 
Fla 452. 
In this same annotation, 4 ALR 2d, at page 26, Sec. 11, 
we read: 
"Even though the court has juris diction over the 
parents or persons with power to bring the non-
resident child within the state, still the court has 
been held to lack power to make a custody award." 
Numerous cases are cited therein in support of this rule. 
In particular see Re Chandler (1940) 36 Cal. App. 2d 583, 
97 P2d 1048; also Giachetti vs. Giachetti (1946) 157 Fla. 
259, 25 So. 2d 658; also Ritchison v. Ritchison (1945) 28 
Tenn. App. 432, 191 SW 2d 188; and Lake v. Lake (1947) 
-Wyo-, 182 P2d 824. 
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POINT IV. NO SERVICE OF PROCESS HAS BEEN 
HAD UPON THE DEFENDANT, MARJORIE STEED, IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THE UTAH COURT HAS 
NO JURISDICTION OVER HER. THE DEFENDANT, 
MARJORIE STEED, IS THE ONE HAVING PRIMARY 
CONTROL OVER THE CHILD AND ONE WHO THE 
COURT COULD EXPECT TO PRODUCE THE CHILD. 
As is apparent from the file in this case, the defen-
dant, Marjorie Steed, was never served with process in the 
habeas corpus proceedings in the State of Utah and the 
Utah Court had no jurisdiction over her. Consequently 
she is not a party to this appeal. Yet she is the person 
who has cared for and mothered the infant since it was 
abandoned to her by the petitioner and appellant, Marla 
Morse. 
Marjorie Steed and not Joe Steed is the one having 
primary control over the child and the one who the court 
could expect to produce the child. 
POINT V. THE DEFENDANTS HAVE FILED A 
PETITION FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE CillLD IN 
IDAHO, WHICH IS THE PROPER COURT AND PRO-
CEEDING TO DETERMINE THE CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILD. 
The defendants, Joe Steed and Marjorie Steed, on Sep-
tember 20, 1957, filed in the Probate Court of Oneida Coun-
ty, State of Idaho, a petition for the adoption of the child. 
The petitioner, Marla Morse, is a party to that proceedings 
in Idaho and represented by counsel. That court would 
seem to be the proper court to determine the custody of the 
child, it clearly having jurisdiction of both of the defen-
dants as well as the child. See opinion of J. Cardozo in 
Finlay v. Finlay N.Y. (1925) 240 N.Y. 429, 148 NE 624 
wherein the court held: 
"The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody 
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of infants found within its territory does not de-
pend upon the domicile of the parents. It has its 
origin in the protection that is due to the incompe-
tent or helpless. (Several cases cited) For this 
the residence of the child suffices, though the 
domicile be elsewhere . . . . " 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court did 
not have jurisdiction in the habeas corpus proceedings and 
that it's judgment dismissing the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. DEE LUND. 
Attorney for Respondent 
Joe Steed 
31 First Security Bank Bldg., 
Brigham City, Utah. 
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